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We introduce the Singapore protocol, a qubit protocol for quantum key distribution that is fully
tomographic, more efficient than other tomographic protocols, and very robust. Under ideal cir-
cumstances the efficiency is log
2
(4/3) = 0.415 key bits per qubit sent. This is 25% more than the
efficiency of 1/3 = 0.333 for the standard six-state protocol, which sets the benchmark. We describe
a simple two-way communication scheme that extracts 0.4 key bits per qubit and thus gets close to
the information-theoretical limit. The noise thresholds that we report for a hierarchy of eavesdrop-
ping attacks demonstrate the robustness of the protocol: A secure key can be extracted if there is
less than 38.9% noise.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Wj, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all real-life implementations of schemes for
quantum key distribution use qubits as the carriers for
the quantum information, and most of them are variants
of the very first proposal, the 1984 scheme by Bennett
and Brassard (BB84, [1]). It has an efficiency of 1/2 un-
der ideal—that is, noise-free—circumstances, which is to
say that, on average, one secure key bit can be extracted
for two qubits exchanged.
The measurements performed in BB84 do not explore
all of the qubit’s Bloch sphere, but only probe a plane.
The tomography of the qubit state is, therefore, partial
rather than complete, which does not matter in ideal,
noise-free operation, but it has its drawbacks when the
quantum channel is noisy. By contrast, the “six-state
protocol” (see, e.g., Ref. [2]) offers full state tomogra-
phy; it is the qubit prototype of the higher-dimensional
tomographic protocols introduced in Ref. [3].
The complete tomography comes at a price; for each
key bit one has to exchange three qubits on average. Full
tomography can be had, however, at a much lower cost,
as is demonstrated by the protocols with minimal qubit
tomography (MQT) that we describe here. They have
an ideal efficiency of log2(4/3) = 0.415 and thus need
only 2.41 qubits per key bit. Put differently, the MQT
protocols are potentially 24.5% more efficient than the
six-state protocol, their competitor among the standard
tomographic protocols.
The key observation is that the tomography of the six-
state protocol is redundant, inasmuch as one measures
six probabilities to determine the three parameters that
specify the qubit state. By contrast, one measures only
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four probabilities in MQT to establish the three param-
eters. As discussed in Ref. [4], qubit tomography of this
minimal kind is possible indeed. Moreover, a simple one-
loop interferometer setup can realize MQT for the polar-
ization qubit of a photon [5]. Non-interferometric setups
are also possible [6], and work very well in practice [7].
Key generation from the raw data is rather straightfor-
ward in the six-state protocol where one performs a ba-
sis matching as one does for BB84. A similar procedure
can be applied to the raw data of MQT protocols—the
“Renes pairing” [8], discussed in Sec. III A—but then the
achieved efficiency is no more than 1/3 = 0.333, the value
of the six-state protocol. Thus, if one wishes, as we do,
to exploit the advantage offered by MQT, one needs to
abandon basis matching and the like in favor of another
procedure. We introduce here one such alternative key
generation method that is simple to describe, and to im-
plement, which extracts 0.4 key bits per qubit and thus
exceeds the benchmark value of 0.333 by much and gets
quite close to the information-theoretical limit of 0.415.
Here is a brief outline. We begin with considering ideal
circumstances in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we then discuss the
key generation by two-way communication. The Singa-
pore protocol is introduced in Sec. IV, with emphasis on
its tomographic element. In Sec. V, we report the noise
thresholds below which the Singapore protocol offers se-
cure key distribution. We close with a summary.
The account given here is a general description of the
scheme and a report of all major results of the detailed
analysis. This analysis itself is presented in two compan-
ion papers [9, 10].
II. IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Let us consider ideal circumstances for a start. We
emphasize the symmetry between the communicating
parties—Alice and Bob—by a scenario in the spirit of Ek-
2ert’s entanglement-based protocol of 1991 [11]. A source
distributes entangled qubits to Alice and Bob, one pair at
a time. Ideally, the source emits the pairs in the singlet
state
∣∣s〉, whose statistical operator
ρAB =
∣∣s〉〈s∣∣ = 1
4
(
1− ~σA · ~σB
)
(1)
is a symmetric function of the Pauli vector operators ~σA
and ~σB for Alice’s and Bob’s qubit, respectively.
For each qubit pair, one of the four detectors at Al-
ice’s end will respond, and one of Bob’s four detectors.
Each set of detectors realizes, for the respective qubit, the
probability operator measurement (POM—in the math-
ematical literature: POVM for positive operator valued
measure) that consists of the four half-projectors
Pk =
1
4
(
1 + ~tk · ~σ
)
, for k = 1, . . . , 4 , (2)
where the unit vectors ~tk have equal angles between
them,
~tk · ~tl = 4
3
δkl − 1
3
, for k, l = 1, . . . , 4 . (3)
Geometrically speaking, they are the normal vectors for
the four faces of a tetrahedron, or one can picture them
as pointing from the center of a cube to four nonadjacent
corners; see Fig. 1 in Ref. [4] for an illustration. Their
linear dependence and completeness, stated respectively
by
4∑
k=1
~tk = 0 and
3
4
4∑
k=1
~tk~tk = 1
↔
, (4)
are basic properties of the tetrahedron vector quartet.
With ~σ → ~σA in Eq. (2) we have the members PAk
for Alice’s POM, and likewise ~σ → ~σB gives Bob’s POM.
The 16 joint probabilities that Alice’s kth detector fires
together with Bob’s lth detector are then given by
pkl = 〈PAkPBl〉
=
1
16
tr
{
ρAB
(
1 + ~tk · ~σA
)(
1 + ~tl · ~σB
)}
(5)
for k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4. Knowledge of these pkls is tantamount
to knowing ρAB because the inverse relation [4]
ρAB =
4∑
k,l=1
(
6PAk − 1
)
pkl
(
6PBl − 1
)
(6)
reconstructs ρAB from the joint probabilities. Indeed,
two-qubit tomography of this kind can be performed and
is highly reliable in practice [12].
We can think of Alice’s measurement as preparing
Bob’s qubit at random in the state corresponding to—
that is, conditioned on—her unpredictable measurement
result. In this sense, she is sending him a random se-
quence of qubits through an effective quantum channel.
In fact, if the pair source is located in Alice’s laboratory,
the pair emission in conjunction with her measurement
is fully equivalent to a single-qubit source. Conversely, if
Alice is really operating a single-qubit source with ran-
dom output, so that the scenario is that of BB84, we can
think of it as an Ekert scenario with a corresponding ef-
fective two-qubit source. Therefore, our analysis applies
to either physical situation.
For the ideal source that emits the singlet states of
Eq. (1), we have
pkl =
1− δkl
12
=
{
0 for k = l ,
1/12 for k 6= l , (7)
that is, two corresponding detectors (k = l) never fire
together and the other twelve cases are equally probable.
Accordingly, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is
IAB =
4∑
k,l=1
pkl log2
pkl
pk·p·l
= log2
4
3
= 0.415 (bits), (8)
where
pk· = 〈PAk〉 =
4∑
l=1
pkl , p·l = 〈PBl〉 =
4∑
k=1
pkl (9)
are the marginal probabilities for her and him, respec-
tively; here simply pk· = p·l =
1
4
. This IAB value exceeds
the value of 1
3
for the six-state protocol [13] by almost
25%.
The number IAB = 0.415 tells us that Alice and Bob
can generate up to 0.415 secure key bits for every qubit
exchanged through the quantum channel, that is, for ev-
ery qubit pair they detect. If they had an appropri-
ate error-correcting code at hand, the key generation
could be done by one-way communication. Unfortu-
nately, however, the best codes that are presently avail-
able have an efficiency below the 0.333 benchmark set by
the six-state protocol [14, 15].
III. KEY GENERATION BY TWO-WAY
COMMUNICATION
The standard methods for generating the secret key-
bit sequence—for the BB84 scheme, the six-state proto-
col, and others—all make use of two-way communication.
Such procedures can also be designed for raw data char-
acterized by the joint probabilities in Eq. (7).
For ease of presentation, we assign letters A, B, C, D to
the measurement results k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, so that the raw
data make up a four-letter random sequence for Alice and
another one for Bob. These sequences are such that the
two letters for a qubit pair are never the same, and the
twelve pairs of different letters are equally frequent. It is
as if Alice were sending a random sequence of the four
letters to Bob, who never receives the letter sent but gets
either one of the other three letters equally likely.
3A. Renes pairing
Renes’s method for key generation [8] amounts to the
following. Suppose Alice has letter A, to which she as-
signs 0 or 1 at random, say 1 to be specific. Then she
chooses randomly one of the other three letters, say B,
and communicates publicly to Bob: “If your letter is A,
call it 0; if you have B, call it 1!”, whereby the letter for
value 0 is always stated first. Bob in turn reports success
if his letter is A or B, failure if he has C or D.
Since Alice has a 1/3 chance of guessing Bob’s letter
right when she pairs B with A, the success probability is
1/3 and the failure probability is 2/3. In case of success,
a pair of potential outcomes is identified with perfect
(anti-)correlations and a key bit is obtained, in full anal-
ogy to the pairs of outcomes that are selected by the basis
matching of the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol.
Indeed, Renes’s method is in the tradition of basis-
matching procedures inasmuch as his pairing selects a
2× 2 submatrix from the 4× 4 matrix of the joint prob-
abilities of Eq. (7). There is a crucial difference though:
Only certain submatrices are useful in the BB84 proto-
col and the six-state protocol and they are systematically
chosen by the basis matching. But for the MQT proba-
bilities of Eq. (7), the choice is not unique; you can pair
A with B or with C or with D. Possibly useful corre-
lations are unavoidably discarded by the Renes pairing
in the unlucky failure cases and, therefore, this method
does not take good advantage of the stronger MQT cor-
relations and does not yield a higher efficiency than the
six-state protocol.
B. Beyond pairing: Iterative key extraction
One can do much better by other procedures that do
not rely on variants of BB84 basis matching and the like.
We describe here one such method, which generates the
secret key bits by an iteration and is rather simple to
implement.
We recall that the raw data consist of a four-letter ran-
dom sequence for Alice and another one for Bob. Each
round of the iterative extraction of the key bits then in-
volves the following steps.
Step 1: Alice chooses one letter at random, say A. She
announces two positions in her sequence where this letter
occurs, while not revealing which letter she has chosen.
Step 2a: If Bob has two different letters at these posi-
tions, say C and D, he forms two groups, one consisting
of his letters (CD), one of the others (AB). He knows for
sure that Alice’s letter is in the second group. He de-
cides at random to which group he assigns value 0 and to
which value 1. Then he announces the two groups and
their values. Alice and Bob both enter the value of the
group that contains Alice’s letter as the next bit of the
secret key.
Step 2b: If Bob has the same letter twice, he an-
nounces that this is the case, not telling, of course, which
letter he got. Alice records her letter as part of a new
sequence for later use. Bob does the same with his let-
ter. The secondary sequences thus formed have the same
statistical properties as the primary sequences.
Alice and Bob repeat steps 1 and 2 as long as there are
enough unused letters. Then they apply the same two-
step procedure to the new sequences created in step 2b,
thereby getting more key bits and two other new se-
quences. Next, these sequences are processed, and so
forth.
As a result, Alice and Bob will share an identical se-
quence of key bits. Nobody else knows the key bits be-
cause the public announcements by Alice in step 1 and
by Bob in steps 2a or 2b reveal nothing at all about the
values of the key bits.
When a key bit is generated from the original se-
quences, which happens with probability 2
3
, two letters
are consumed to get it. For a key bit from the first put-
aside sequences, the probability is 1
3
× 2
3
and four letters
are used altogether. For a key bit from the second put-
aside sequences, eight letters are spent with a success
probability of 1
3
× 1
3
× 2
3
; and so forth.
If the original sequences are N letters long, we thus get
(1
3
+ 1
18
+ 1
108
+ · · ·)N key bits in total. The asymptotic
efficiency is therefore
lim
n→∞
2
5
[
1−
(
1
6
)n ]
=
2
5
= 0.4 , (10)
which falls short of the theoretical maximum of 0.415,
but not by much [16]. Owing to the geometric conver-
gence, just a few rounds are sufficient in practice, the
efficiencies being 0.333, 0.389, 0.398 for one, two, three
rounds, respectively. In short, it is easy to get above the
1
3
efficiency of the six-state protocol.
C. Hybridization
In any practical implementation of the iterative key
generation one has to settle for a finite number of rounds.
It is then beneficiary to apply the Renes pairing in the
final iteration round, i.e., Step 2b’: If Bob has the same
letter twice, he chooses another letter at random to form
a Renes pair, which he communicates to Alice.
The efficiency is then
2
5
[
1−
(
1
6
)n ]
+
1
3
(
1
6
)n
=
2
5
[
1−
(
1
6
)n+1 ]
(11)
for a total number of n rounds. Thus, this hybrid reaches
the n-iteration yield of Eq. (10) after n− 1 rounds.
IV. THE SINGAPORE PROTOCOL
The tetrahedron version of Renes’s “spherical codes”
[8] uses the pairing method of Sec. III A for the key gen-
eration from the raw data obtained by MQT. It does
4not take advantage of the tomographic power offered by
MQT.
In marked contrast, systematic state tomography is
a defining element of the Singapore protocol on which
we will focus now. The Singapore protocol is specified
by (i) MQT for the acquisition of raw data; (ii) state
tomography for the characterization of the source; (iii)
key generation by the iteration method of Sec. III B, or
by the hybrid method of Sec. III C, or by some other
procedure of high efficiency. The choice of method in
(iii) distinguishes variants of the Singapore protocol, but
they all have (i) and (ii) in common.
A. The tomographic element
The tomographic element in the Singapore protocol ex-
ploits Eq. (6). After the detection of many qubits, Alice
and Bob select a random subset of the qubit pairs and
reveal to each other, and everybody else, the measure-
ment results obtained for them. The relative frequencies
of the pair events—for which fraction of the pairs did she
get, say, a B and he a D?—can serve as simple estimates
for the joint probabilities (p24 for the BD events). When
used in Eq. (6), they provide an estimate of the two-qubit
state emitted by the source. The more refined methods
of quantum state estimation [17] are likely to give better
and more reliable estimates, if the need arises, but in the
context of the Singapore protocol this is less important.
Rather, Alice and Bob check whether the actual rela-
tive frequencies are consistent with the expected output
of the qubit-pair source. They proceed with the key gen-
eration only if the source passes the test. If it fails, the
data are rejected as unreliable, and a different source is
used. The “source” encompasses here everything that is
involved in delivering the qubits to Alice and Bob: the
physical source plus the transmission lines. In the equiv-
alent scenario in which Alice produces qubits and sends
them to Bob, the tomography establishes the properties
of the quantum channel through which the qubits are
transmitted. One can then judge whether the channel is
acceptable or not.
One could think that an essential part of the checking
is to make sure that the qubit pairs are statistically in-
dependent. This would require a careful look at the joint
probabilities for two or more qubit pairs. With a limited
number of data sacrificed for the purpose of tomography,
the confidence level will be high for two pairs, lower for
three pairs, even lower for four pairs, and so forth. But
if Alice and Bob are willing to pay the price, they can
reach the confidence level they desire.
In fact, however, such elaborate checks of statistical
independence are not necessary because one can rely on
the quantum version of the de Finetti theorem [18]. It
ensures that the ensemble of qubit pairs is, for all prac-
tical purposes, equivalent to an ensemble of statistically
independent pairs if all operations (consistency check of
the relative frequencies of paired qubits iterative key gen-
eration) use randomly selected pairs.
It is worth emphasizing that Alice and Bob must
have criteria according to which they decide whether the
source is trustworthy. With a finite number of data at
hand, there can never be absolute certainty about sta-
tistical properties. In this respect, the tomography of
the Singapore protocol, and the conclusions about secu-
rity drawn from it, is on equal footing with the typicality
assumptions in the security analysis of schemes for quan-
tum key distribution that follow the paradigm of BB84.
It is, so to say, a matter of your level of distrust. When
testing a coin that is supposedly unbiased, many would
have serious doubts if a million trials gave 70% heads.
But if you are leery, you might mistrust the coin after
getting seven heads in ten trials.
B. Acceptable sources
An acceptable source would emit independent qubit
pairs in the singlet state of Eq. (1) with an admixture of
unbiased noise—or, equivalently, the noise of an accept-
able transmission channel must be unbiased [19]. Accord-
ingly, the statistical properties of the observed detection
events must be consistent with the joint probabilities
pkl =
4− ǫ
48
(1− δkl) + ǫ
16
δkl (12)
that derive from the two-qubit state of the form
ρAB =
∣∣s〉(1− ǫ)〈s∣∣+ ǫ
4
, (13)
where ǫ specifies the noise level: no noise for ǫ = 0; noth-
ing but noise for ǫ = 1. The range of interest is 0 ≤ ǫ < 2
3
because ρAB is separable if ǫ ≥ 23 , and then the correla-
tions exhibited by the pkls are of a classical nature and
possess no genuine quantum properties. The mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob for the pkls of Eq. (12),
IAB =
(
1− ǫ
4
)
log2
(
4− ǫ
3
)
+
ǫ
4
log2 ǫ , (14)
decreases monotonically from the ǫ = 0 value of 0.415 to
0.0292 for ǫ = 2
3
.
It is improbable that the noise in real quantum chan-
nels is truly unbiased. Therefore, Alice and Bob ensure
the joint probabilities of Eq. (12) by twirling: for each
pair of detection events the assigning of the letters A, B,
C, D to the detectors is done by a random choice of one
of the 24 permutations of the letters.
C. Eavesdropping
All noise is potentially resulting from eavesdropper
Eve’s attempts at acquiring knowledge about the key
bits. She is given complete control over the source, and
the best she can do is to prepare a pure state in which
5all the qubit pairs sent to Alice and Bob are entangled
with a gigantic ancilla.
Upon tracing over the ancilla degrees of freedom, we
get the state of many qubit pairs received by Alice and
Bob which—as a result of the full tomography or as an
implication of the quantum de Finetti theorem—is known
to be a product state with one factor for each qubit pair.
As a consequence of the Schmidt decomposition of the
pure entangled state, the reduced ancilla state is unitarily
equivalent to this product state, so that Eve’s ancilla
consists of independent qubit pairs, one for each pair sent
to Alice and Bob.
Accordingly, Eve’s optimal strategy [9] amounts to en-
tangling each qubit pair emitted by the source with a
two-qubit ancilla, and to keep all these ancillas as quan-
tum records when the qubit pairs are sent to Alice and
Bob. Eve must ensure that the noisy singlet state (13)
results when
∣∣S〉〈S∣∣ is traced over the ancilla degrees of
freedom, where
∣∣S〉 is the ket for the joint state of a qubit
pair sent to Alice and Bob and the qubit pair of its an-
cilla. This requirement determines
∣∣S〉 completely, up to
irrelevant unitary transformations on the ancilla (see [3]
and the appendix in [20]), namely,∣∣S〉 = ∣∣s12s34〉√1− ǫ+ ∣∣s13s24〉i√ǫ . (15)
Here,
∣∣sjk〉 is the singlet for qubits j and k, whereby
qubits 1 and 2 are sent to Alice and Bob, and qubits 3
and 4 compose the ancilla. Thus, in this most symmetric
choice for
∣∣S〉, the qubit pair of Eve’s ancilla is on equal
footing with the pair sent to Alice and Bob.
V. NOISE THRESHOLDS FOR THE
SINGAPORE PROTOCOL
We consider four different eavesdropping attacks. In
the first attack, Eve tries to learn as much as she can
about the original letter sequences recorded by Alice and
Bob and does not wait until the public communication
between them reveals additional clues. Eve can thus mea-
sure her ancillas immediately after the qubits haven been
sent to Alice and Bob, or even before the qubits leave
the source, so that this attack could be realized by just
emitting a sequence of mixed two-qubit states from the
source. This mixed-state attack is relevant if Eve cannot
store the ancillas for later processing and Alice and Bob
use a suitable code, such as those discussed in Ref. [14],
to generate the cryptographic key by one-way communi-
cation. If Eve can, however, process the ancillas as late as
she wishes, we have the situation discussed in Sec. VC.
In the second attack, the raw-data attack on the gener-
ated key bits, Eve takes into account what she learns from
the public communication between Alice and Bob when
they execute the steps of Secs. III B and III C. But she
continues to rely on the data she gains by the mixed-state
attack. Given the limitations of present-day technology,
this is the strongest attack Alice and Bob have to fear in
practice.
A much stronger attack, however, is the third attack
we consider, the collective attack on the generated key
bits. Here, Eve performs a collective measurement on
all the ancillas to those qubit pairs that contribute to
the key bit under attack, exploiting fully the information
revealed publicly by Alice and Bob while they execute
steps of Secs. III B and III C. Depending on the iteration
round in which the key bit is generated, this will involve
two, four, eight, . . . ancillas, each of them itself a qubit
pair.
In order to implement the collective attack, Eve must
be able to store the ancillas for a long time, because Al-
ice and Bob can process their raw data long after it has
been acquired, and she must be able to process the an-
cillas jointly. Both tasks are beyond the quantum tech-
nology of today and the foreseeable future. But once the
technology exists, such attacks will be a matter of real
concern.
Therefore, we should also consider the strongest at-
tack conceivable: the message attack. Here, Eve waits
even longer, until after Alice and Bob have processed the
keys generated by the steps of Secs. III B and III C by
the standard methods of privacy amplification and er-
ror correction, and have used the final sequence of key
bits to encrypt a message. Rather than trying to learn
the values of the key bits at any intermediate stage, Eve
attempts to decrypt the message itself, thereby making
optimal use of all the public information exchanged be-
tween Alice and Bob up to, and including, the encrypted
message.
We are content here with giving brief accounts of the
results of analyzing these eavesdropping attacks. The
technical details are reported in two companion papers,
Refs. [9] and [10].
A. Mixed-state attack
For each of Alice’s detection events, there is a con-
ditioned ancilla state of rank 2. It is as if Alice were
sending a random sequence of four different ancilla states
to Eve, each occurring one-fourth of the time. Eve ex-
tracts the information accessible to her by measuring the
ancillas with the POM that is optimal for this purpose.
For ǫ > 0.1725, Eve’s optimal POM has four possible
outcomes and its structure is analogous to the optimal
POM for the six-state protocol that is given in Ref. [21].
For ǫ < 0.1725, the optimal POM has five elements and
extracts slightly more information (less than 1%) than
the four-member POM.
In the more relevant range of ǫ > 0.1725, the joint
probabilities for Alice’s kth result and Eve’s lth result
are given by the pkls of Eq. (5) with ǫ replaced by
η =
(√
1− 3
4
ǫ −
√
3
4
ǫ
)2
. (16)
Upon presenting this relation in the form
(1 − 3
2
ǫ)2 + (1 − η)2 = 1 , (17)
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FIG. 1: Mutual information and yield for key generation by
one-way communication. Top figure: Mutual information
about the raw data between Alice and Bob (IAB, curves a)
and between Alice and Eve (IAE, curves b), for the range
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 2
3
of nonseparable source states. The solid lines are
for the four-outcome POM of the MQT protocols, the dashed
lines for the six-outcome POM of the six-state protocol. For
both POMs, the intersection of the respective a and b curves
is at ǫ = 0.2363. The dash-dotted curve c is the common
Holevo bound. It intersects the curves a at ǫ = 0.1265 and
ǫ = 0.1086 for the four-outcome POM and the six-outcome
POM, respectively. Bottom figure: The Csisza´r–Ko¨rner yields
∆I = IAB−IAE for the mixed-state attack of Sec. VA for the
four-state POM (solid line) and the six-state POM (dashed
line), for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.24. The two dash-dotted lines show the
respective yields for the message attack of Sec. VC. Note that
these plots refer to one-way communication schemes, whereas
the Singapore protocol and the six-state protocol rely on two-
way communication.
we observe a fundamental symmetry between the noise
level ǫ in the Alice–Bob channel and the noise level η in
the Alice–Eve channel. Note in particular that η = 1 for
ǫ = 0 and η = 0 for ǫ = 2
3
. That is, when there is no
noise in the channel from Alice to Bob, there is nothing
but noise between Alice and Eve; and when Alice and
Bob receive their qubits in a separable state, the effective
transmission from Alice to Eve is noiseless.
The resulting mutual information between Alice and
Eve, IAE, and also that between Bob and Eve, is given
by the right-hand side of Eq. (14) with ǫ → η. We have
ǫ < η and therefore IAB > IAE for
ǫ <
1
5
2
+
√
3
= 0.2363 . (18)
The Csisza´r–Ko¨rner (CK) theorem [22] then ensures that
a secret key can be generated, by a fitting code for one-
way communication, with an efficiency of IAB− IAE. We
note that the six-state protocol has the same CK thresh-
old [21], and the CK efficiency of MQT protocols, such
as the Singapore protocol, is larger for all values below
their common CK threshold. See Fig. 1 for a graphical
summary of these observations about the mixed-state at-
tack.
B. Attacks on the generated key bits
This CK threshold does not apply, however, if Alice
and Bob generate the binary key with the iterative proce-
dures of Secs. III B and III C, which involve two-way com-
munication. The secondary sequences formed in step 2b,
from primary sequences characterized by ǫ, have statisti-
cal properties of the kind stated by the joint probabilities
in Eq. (5) but with ǫ replaced by ǫ2/[1 + 1
3
(1 − ǫ)2], i.e.,
with quadratically less noise. Accordingly, the raw key
bits that Alice and Bob obtain in the successive rounds
have error probabilities of
[
1 +
(
4− ǫ
3ǫ
)2n−1]−1
∝ ǫ2n−1 for the nth round,
(19)
so that the quality of the bits improves markedly from
one iteration round to the next. But also Eve’s eaves-
dropping gets more efficient. She has two ancillas to
examine for each first-round bit, four ancillas for each
second-round bit, . . . , 2n ancillas for each nth-round bit.
We illustrate this matter by a closer look at the first-
round bits; see the n = 1, L = 2 row in Table I. For
each of Alice’s bits, there is now a two-ancilla state of
rank 9, conditioned on her bit value [10]. It is as if she
were sending a random sequence of two different two-
ancilla states to Eve, both occurring equally frequently.
There are then various strategies for Eve, of which the
two extreme ones are the raw-data attack and the mes-
sage attack introduced above, and the collective attack
is intermediate.
In the raw-data attack [9], Eve measures the ancillas
one-by-one and employs the POM of Sec. VA for this
purpose, so that she is not modifying her POM in the
light of the information exchanged by Alice and Bob pub-
licly. Just like it is the case for the mixed-state attack,
there is no need for Eve to wait until this information is
available. She can measure the ancillas immediately after
sending the qubits to Alice and Bob or, equivalently, she
could send suitably prepared mixed two-qubit states to
them. The public information is only taken into account
7for the interpretation of the data. While this raw-data
attack is rather weak, it is of quite some interest because
it is the best an eavesdropper can do with present-day
technology.
Not unexpectedly, the collective attack [10] is much
stronger. For its implementation, Eve applies the POM
that is optimized for the two-ancilla states that she re-
ceives. The difference is indeed striking: For the raw-data
attack, Alice and Bob are on the safe side if ǫ < 0.3324,
whereas they fall prey to the collective attack unless
ǫ < 0.2628.
We note that both values are above the CK threshold of
Eq. (18). If they only have to fear these collective attacks,
Alice and Bob can, therefore, extract secure key bits from
their sequences of raw first-round bits if ǫ < 0.2628; and
for ǫ < 0.2945 the final-pairing bits of the first round can
be trusted for key extraction. For this purpose, Alice
and Bob will have to use an appropriate error-correcting
code and a privacy amplification protocol for the effective
binary channel thus defined, much like one does it in
other protocols for quantum key distribution.
But, further information becomes available to Eve dur-
ing the error correction and the privacy amplification.
The message attack [10] takes all of this additional infor-
mation into account as well. As in the collective attack,
Eve exploits the conditioned two-ancilla states, yet in a
much more exhaustive manner. The resulting thresh-
old values are obtained by calculating the Holevo bound
[23, 24], which in fact is technically much less demand-
ing than the search for the optimal POMs needed for the
raw-data attack and the collective attack.
It follows that the absolute noise thresholds for the
first-round keys are ǫ = 0.2182 for the iteration bits and
ǫ = 0.2422 for the final-paring bits. Both are noticeably
below the thresholds for the collective attack, and the
first one is even below the CK threshold.
The analysis for the second-round bits is analogous but
now there are four ancillas to be examined jointly; and
there are eight ancillas for each key bit of the third round;
and so forth. We report in Table I the thresholds found
in Ref. [9] for the raw-data attack and in Ref. [10] for the
collective attack and the message attack, for both the key
bits gained during the iteration step of Sec. III B and by
the final pairing of Sec. III C. Note that the thresholds
are consistently higher for the later iteration rounds, and
the message-attack asymptotic threshold for the final-
pairing bits at ǫ = 0.3893 identifies the noise level be-
low which secure key generation is assuredly possible. In
practice, of course, one would operate well below this
value to have a reasonable efficiency.
Consider, for example, a noise level of ǫ = 0.25, slightly
above the BB84 threshold [25, 26]. If Alice and Bob
only have to fear raw-data attacks, all iteration rounds
give secure bits including the L = 1 final-pairing bits
of Renes’s scheme. These L = 1 bits are not secure,
however, if one must protect against collective attacks.
And if Alice and Bob are afraid of message attacks, they
can only use the iteration bits from the third and later
TABLE I: Noise thresholds for the Singapore protocol. For
n = 1, 2, or 3 iterations, involving L = 2n letters respectively,
we report the thresholds for the three eavesdropping attacks
considered in Sec. VB: the raw-data attack [9], the collective
attack [10], and the message attack [10]. For each attack,
there are two columns of threshold values, the thresholds for
the key bits gained during the iteration step of Sec. III B (ǫit),
and the thresholds for the key bits generated by the final
pairing of Sec. IIIC (ǫFP) if the iteration stops with the nth
round. The entries for L = 1 refer to Renes’s original pairing
procedure of Ref. [8], discussed in Sec. III A. The last row
states the asymptotic thresholds for n,L≫ 1. The values
for the message attack are absolute thresholds; there is no
eavesdropping strategy with lower thresholds.
raw-data attack collective attack message attack
n L ǫit ǫFP ǫit ǫFP ǫit ǫFP
1 0.2868 0.2347 0.1920
1 2 0.3324 0.3598 0.2628 0.2945 0.2182 0.2422
2 4 0.3742 0.4241 0.2959 0.3405 0.2482 0.2976
3 8 0.4143 0.4745 0.3401 0.3649 0.2997 0.3340
∞ 0.5091 0.5714 0.3753 0.3893 0.3753 0.3893
rounds and the final pairing bits from the second round
onwards.
C. Message attack for one-way key generation
If Eve can store the ancillas and process them at a late
time, she can also implement a more powerful attack on
one-way key generation than the mixed-state attack of
Sec. VA. She would wait until Alice and Bob have en-
crypted a message after performing the necessary error
correction and privacy amplification, and would then at-
tack that message. Thereby, Eve’s power is only limited
by the Holevo bound.
Now, the six ancilla states conditioned on Alice’s mea-
surement result of the six-state POM and the four ancilla
states for the four-state POM are unitarily equivalent
rank-2 states with nonzero eigenvalues 1 − 1
2
ǫ and 1
2
ǫ;
and the unconditioned ancilla state is the same for all
POMs, the singlet with an admixture of unbiased noise
of (13). Accordingly, there is a common Holevo bound
for the four-outcome POM of the MQT protocols and the
six-outcome POM of the six-state protocol; see Fig. 1.
The corresponding noise thresholds turn out to be
quite low: ǫ = 0.1086 for the six-outcome POM, and
ǫ = 0.1265 for the four-outcome POM. One is clearly re-
warded here for employing a minimal tomographic POM
rather than a POM with redundancy.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
In summary, the Singapore protocol for quantum key
distribution introduced here can tolerate much higher
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FIG. 2: Yield of the Singapore protocol under the message
attack. The plots show the yield for key generation that uses
up to L = 8 letters of the raw-data sequences. The various
curves are for L = 1: Renes’s original pairing scheme, L = 2:
termination after the first round, L = 4: termination after
the second round, and L = 8: termination after the third
round. In the two top plots, which cover the ranges ǫ < 0.25
and 0.21 < ǫ < 0.25, the curves for L = 4 and L = 8 are in-
discernible. They are resolved in the two bottom plots, where
0.25 < ǫ < 0.3 and 0.295 < ǫ < 0.335. The various cusps in
the curves are at the threshold values of the last column pair
in Table I.
noise levels than the BB84 protocol and is substantially
more efficient than its tomographic competitor, the six-
state protocol. The raw data, which consists of two
random four-letter sequences with correlations between
them, can be converted into secret key bits by an itera-
tive procedure that uses two-way communication.
The results of the security analysis—detailed accounts
given in Refs. [9, 10]—are concisely summarized in Ta-
ble I and Fig. 2. Table I reports the noise thresholds
for the hierarchy of eavesdropping attacks considered:
the raw-data attack, the collective attack, and the mes-
sage attack. The weakest of them is the raw-data attack,
which is the one that is to be feared within the limita-
tions of today’s technology, and the most powerful attack
is the message attack, which is as strong as the laws of
physics permit and thus determines the absolute noise
thresholds.
These thresholds are clearly visible in the plots of the
yield that are shown in Fig. 2. Consistent with the
thresholds in Table I, a nonzero yield can be had for
ǫ < 0.242 with a single round of key generation, whereas
two or more rounds are needed for larger noise levels,
with three rounds being sufficient for ǫ < 0.334.
It should be kept in mind that our analysis refers to
the specified procedure for generating the key bits that
is introduced in Sec. III. When a different procedure is
adopted, such as those alluded to in Ref. [16], the noise
thresholds will be different as well.
We wish to emphasize that the higher efficiency of
the Singapore protocol does not result from a deliberate
asymmetry, as it is the case in the asymmetric variant
of BB84 that is thoroughly studied by Lo, Chau, and
Ardehali in Ref. [27]. Both the six-state protocol and
the Singapore protocol are symmetric in the sense that
all of Alice’s and Bob’s detectors have the same a priori
probability of registering the next qubit.
Asymmetric versions of the Singapore protocol can be
realized either by distorting the tetrahedrons [28] or by
using a source that emits the qubit pairs in a biased state
rather than the singlet. In the absence of noise, the effi-
ciency of distorted-tetrahedron schemes can be as close to
unity as one wishes, quite analogously to the asymmetric
BB84-type protocol of Ref. [27], but then it is very costly
to perform reliable tomography.
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